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ABSTRACT Advancement of consensus protocols in recent years has enabled distributed ledger
technologies (DLTs) to find its application and value in sectors beyond cryptocurrencies. Here we reviewed
66 known consensus protocols and classified them into philosophical and architectural categories, also
providing a visual representation. As a case study, we focus on the public sector and highlighted potential
protocols. We have also listed these protocols against basic features and sector preference in a tabular format
to facilitate selection. We argue that no protocol is a silver bullet, therefore should be selected carefully,
considering the sector requirements and environment.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain technology, consensus algorithms, distributed consensus protocols, distributed
ledger technology, DLTs for public sector, distributed systems, Govtech, permissioned and permissionless
blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving consensus is a fundamental problem in distributed
computing. Lamport et al. [1] discussed the challenges of
achieving consensus in a distributed environment over three
decades ago. The authors exemplify the challenge as Byzan-
tine General Problem, where a consensus within the n gen-
erals (referred as nodes) is required to establish trust on
the information they receive and based on the information
decide whether they should attack or retreat from a siege
they are currently under. Addressing the Byzantine General
Problem and achieving fault tolerance is at the core of any
distributed ledger. Fault tolerance is achieved by introducing
redundancy and information is agreed upon via agreed con-
sensus protocol. Building resilient systems that can deliver
high availability and consistency through redundancy, toler-
ating network and communication failures, power cuts or any
other catastrophe, have been an area of active research for
the last three decades. ISIS [2], Paxos [3], Raft [4], view-
stamped replication (VSR) [5], Chubby [6] and Zookeeper [7]
are just to name a few of the attempts at synchronizing critical
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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information across a distributed ledger. The objective of all
of these attempts is to achieve availability and consistency
though redundancy.
A consensus protocol must possess three key
properties [8]:
1) Safety/Consistency – Given some input, all nodes in a
distributed setting should produce the same output.
2) Liveness – The majority honest nodes should keep the
network alive.
3) Fault Tolerance – The network should tolerate some
faults (f ) in a setup of nodes (n).
Fischer et al. [9] argue that no deterministic consensus pro-
tocol can simultaneously guarantee property A, B & C in
a distributed system (FLP theorem). Fault tolerance being
critical, distributed systems tend to choose between safety
and liveness, depending on the system requirements and
set assumptions. Majority of the earlier protocols assumed
that the replication environments was trusted and free of
adversaries. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), however,
requires the network to achieve consensus without any inter-
mediaries and in a byzantine environment (Network with
adversaries present). Satoshi Nakamoto, through his/her/their
landmark paper ‘‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
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System’’ [10] have excited the world by the ingenious idea
of having a decentralised currency which does not need a
central authority. A network of nodes maintain a ledger of all
the transactions and they all share the same version of truth
via the novel use of PoW, [11] to achieve consensus among
the participating nodes. DLTs in general and blockchain in
particular, have gained popularity, following its successful
implantation in Bitcoin.
Consensus is at the core of any DLT. We reviewed 66 tra-
ditional and contemporary consensus protocols that we have
come across in the academic literature or whitepaper publi-
cations. Based on their characteristics, we have categorised
them into architectural and philosophical categories. We then
present a comparison of these protocols from business use
case point of view and use public sector as a reference and
provide a table summarizing our findings for the discussed
consensus protocols. We believe that private/permissioned
DLTs and off-chain solutions better suit public services sector
needs as it offers privacy and control for governmental and
other public sector organizations.
We have not found any previous work with such large
coverage of consensus protocols and providing any form of
visual and tabular representation on how they are intercon-
nected or categorised. None of the earlier attempts discuss the
suitability of consensus protocols from public sector point of
view or recommended any consensus protocols by analyzing
the features of consensus protocol. Previous works include
providing frameworks for evaluation or reviewing some of
the popular ones. Bach et al. [12] has done a comparative
analysis of consensus protocols used in top 10 cryptocur-
rencies by market cap. The authors have focused only on
the cryptocurrencies and have not focused on private DLTs.
Cachin and Vukolic [13] have scanned the literature on con-
sensus protocols for permissioned DLTs. The focus of writing
is on fault tolerance and resilience in permissioned setting.
More recent work from Nguyen and Kim [14] is a litera-
ture review of several consensus protocols, summarizing and
classifying them as proof based and vote based consensus
protocols. The authors argue that vote-based consensus proto-
cols are more suitable for private DLTs whereas proof-based
consensus protocols are more suitable for public blockchains.
Jun [15] has reviewed the landscape of blockchain adoption
by governments and have provided summarized tables of
different public sector initiatives. Reference [15] goes on
tabulating different electronic voting systems and the under-
lying blockchain technologies. Reference [16] highlights the
potential promises and benefits of using DLTs in public sec-
tor. Tuan et al. [17] have compared some consensus proto-
cols from the network setting point of view, discussing their
suitability for public or private DLTs. Xu et al. [18] has
ranked different blockchain models for cost efficiency, per-
formance and flexibility. Bano et al. [19] have reviewed the
performance and security of different consensus protocols,
providing a common evaluation framework to visualize the
capabilities of the protocols.
The rest of the paper is set as following; Section II defines
DLT and discusses the variants of DLTs. Section III pro-
vides a visual representation of classification of consensus
protocols based on the underlying data structure and their
suitability for public and private DLTs. Reviewed consensus
protocols are also discussed in section III. Section IV briefly
discusses the preferred DLT choices of public sector and pro-
vides a list of suitable consensus protocols for public sector
following the discussion. We then provide our conclusion
in section V.
II. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT)
For non-technical person, DLT is like a WhatsApp group
chat. Once a message is sent to the group, the whole group
become the witness of ‘‘what, who, when’’ of the message.
As long as the majority of participants in the group chat are
honest, this message will be safe and deemed as truth. From
technical point of view, DLT is an approach for maintaining
distributed copies of a single ledger across multiple data
stores. It allows to record, share and sync data across the
network in such away that thewhole network reaches consen-
sus on the content of the ledger and secures the information,
such that it cannot be altered in the future. This immutability
property of the DLTs make them suitable for a variety of
businesses applications where accurate and honest record of
historical transactions is important and data sharing between
multiple participants is required. Thus DLT finds its use in
finance [20], public sector [15], [16], [21], [22], identity
management [23], supply chain [24], [25], insurance [26],
healthcare [27], [28], IOT [29], [30] and several other
domains [29].
Philosophically DLTs can be classified into three broad
categories, Public, Private and Consortium, based on the
consensus participation, read/write permissions and the level
of centralization. Public DLTs are fully decentralised. No one
controls the network and participation in consensus process
is open to everyone and all transactions are visible to the
public. This ‘‘openness’’ ensures that the data on the DLT
cannot be changed once it has been validated and accepted
by the network. Bitcoin and Ethereum are examples of a
public DLTs.
In private DLTs, only authorized nodes from an organiza-
tion can take part in the consensus and have read/write per-
mission in private DLTs. One or multiple entities control the
access to the private DLTs, restricting the participation in the
network. Hyperledger Fabric and Multichain are examples of
private DLTs.
Consortiums are essentially private DLTs shared between
multiple organizations. Different organizations come together
to form a consortium and nominate members to take part in
the consensus process. Quoram and Corda are examples of
consortium DLTs.
Private (including consortiums) DLTs offer better final-
ity (stable consensus) because the whole network gen-
erally follows the leader and consensus is collaborative
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TABLE 1. Comparison of three types of DLTs inspired by [31] and [14].
(through committee) rather than competitive. Table 1 shows
the comparison of the three categories of DLTs
Architecturally, DLTs are categorised into two broad cat-
egories – the linear Blockchain and Direct Acyclic Graphs
(DAGs). The consensus mechanism in blockchain is compet-
itive type (only one block can make into the blockchain at
a time) while in DAGs it is swarm type (transactions/blocks
can be added to the network in parallel) [32]. BlockDag is a
hybrid of Blockchain and DAG, proposed as a solution to the
scalability challenges of blockchain [33].
A. BLOCKCHAIN
Originally used by Haber [34] for secure timestamping of
digital documents and later modified by Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2008 for the crypto currency Bitcoin [10], blockchain is
essentially a peer to peer distributed, immutable, append-
only data structure. Transactions are grouped together into
blocks and each block has a pointer to its previous block,
such that any anomaly in the ‘‘chain’’ formation can be easily
detected. Nodesmaintaining the blockchain agree on the data,
transactions, ordering of the blocks and provide a distributed
log of events. Blockchain can tolerate a variety of faults and
is designed to operate in extreme byzantine environments.
Nodes maintaining the blockchain have to contribute to the
security of network by investing in computational power,
storage, and memory or have direct stake in the platform.
B. DIRECT ACYCLIC GRAPHS (DAGS)
A DAG is a finite directed graph with no directed cycles,
consisting of finite number of edges and vertices, where each
edge is directed from one vertex to another, such that there
is no path that connects a vertex V to itself [32]. Unlike
blockchains with competitive consensus models, the consen-
sus model in DAGs is cooperative. DAGs also offer paral-
lelism by allowing a more general connectivity to the existing
events stored in the ledger [35].
C. BLOCKDAG
BlockDAG is a hybrid of Blockchain and DAG that offers
scalability to the blockchain by mining blocks in parallel
and growing the chain in a DAG formation. Non-conflicting
transactions are allowed to be mined on separate chains and
are selectively merged by mining a block that adds both of
these to the main chain [36].
III. CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
In a distributed environment, consensus protocols are imple-
mented to ensure that all state replications happen according
to pre-defined state transitions and rules. Achieving consen-
sus in a distributed system is challenging. Consensus proto-
cols must be resilient to nodes failure, network partitions,
message delays, ordering and corruption [37]. Numerous
protocols have been proposed, with each protocol making the
required set of assumptions in terms of synchrony, message
broadcasts, failures, malicious nodes, performance and secu-
rity of themessages exchanged [37]. Each consensus protocol
tries to achieve the stability in the network of nnodes where
f nodes can be faulty. Generally a network needs n ≥ 2f + 1
entities to toleratef failures [38].
FIGURE 1. Relationship of different consensus protocols with different
philosophy-based categories of DLTs. Public category related protocols are
linked by red lines while Private/Consortium categories by green lines.
We present the 66 known (at the time of writing this
review) consensus protocols for DLTs in Fig. 1 and 2;
followed by brief description of each protocol. Fig. 1 presents
the protocols in relation to philosophical categorization of
DLTs and other attributes listed in Table 1. For visualization
ease, we have combined private & consortium DLTs together
so that protocols that can be used in all three categories
(e.g. PBFT) can be placed in the middle.
Fig. 2 presents the protocols in relation to architectural
categorization of DLTs as described in section II. We fur-
ther describe the consensus protocols, where 1-61 describe
the consensus protocols used in blockchain architectures.
62-64 in DAGs and 65-66 in BlockDAGs. Blockchain centric
protocols are ordered according to their relevance - starting
from the common ones such as PoW, PoS, PoA, PBFT and
then discussing their variations.
A. Proof of Work (POW)
Originally proposed by Dwork and Naor [39] to combat
phishing emails, Satoshi Nakamoto adopted PoW as a con-
sensus mechanism for Bitcoin [10]. PoW requires the miners
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FIGURE 2. 2. Relationship of different consensus protocols with different
architecture-based categories of DLTs. Blockchain related protocols are
linked by red lines, DAG by orange lines and BlockDAG by green lines.
Interrelationship among protocols particularly with common protocols
(e.g. PoW, PoS) to others are linked by black lines with saturation
representing the number of interrelationships.
(nodes attempting to add a block to the blockchain) to rigor-
ously find a nonce n which satisfies a difficulty level l, such
that combined hash of nonce n and the hash of block header
b is less than the set difficulty level. Mathematically l can be
written as,
H (n||H (b)) < l
When such nonce is found, the miner creates the block and
announces it to the network. Other nodes in the network then
verify the block by computing the hash and verifying the
requirements.
Changing anything from a block is impossible without
redoing the work. Changing history is even harder as a user
will be required to re-computen that satisfies l for all blocks
mined after the block under attack. This requires significant
amount of computational power, known as hash rate [10].
B. DELAYED PROOF OF WORK (DPOW)
Newly formed blockchains that do not have enough computa-
tional or staking power behind them and therefore are an easy
target for attackers. DPoW proposes the use of established
blockchain with high hash rate (currently Bitcoin), to secure
the transactions on a smaller blockchain which do not have
enough computational power behind it. n number of notary
nodes are elected using a stake-weighted vote. These notary
nodes are responsible for ‘‘archiving’’ the data on the selected
PoW blockchain. DPoW does not strictly follow the longest
chain rule but the longest chain rule is applied up to the
most recent backup onto the PoW network. Furthermore,
Notaries can elect to switch to another PoW network if the
alternative offers greater hashing power or the transaction
costs go substantially high [40].
C. PROOF OF PROOF (POP)
Similar to DPoW, PoP aims to enable a security inhering
blockchain IB (low hashrate or newly formed blockchains)
inherit the security of a security provider blockchain SP
(established blockchains). The miners in PoP publish the
current state of IB onto SP [41].
D. HYBRID PROOF OF WORK (HPOW)
HPoW is an energy considerate variant of PoW consensus
protocol. It removes the profit incentive for miners, making
it impractical for the mining farms to mine a network using
HPoW, encouraging the solo miners with low computational
resources to take part in the consensus. HPoW in Lynx
requires that a miner cannot have been the recipient of mining
reward in previous 60 blocks, the reward address should have
a minimum of 1000 coinage (a product of coins in miner
rewards address and the difficulty of previous 10th block) and
the last two characters of SHA256 hash of miner’s reward
address must match the last two characters of block hash
value [42]. This randomises the winning node and does not
guarantee the fastest node to claim the reward.
E. PROOF OF ELAPSED TIME (POET)
Originally proposed by Intel, PoET is intended to run in a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as Intel’s Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX). Block leaders are randomly
chosen by lottery-based model of SGX, to finalize the block.
Each validating node requests TEE for a randomwaiting time.
All nodes work on the puzzle and announce the block after
the waiting time, along with the waiting proof created by
TEE that all participant nodes can verify easily [43]. This
takes away the advantage of having higher computational
power as the miner with smallest waiting time would be
able to announce the block quickly. PoET requires dedicated
hardware which limits the participation and decentralization.
Milutinovic et al. [44] has discussed a similar approach called
‘‘Proof of Luck’’ where nodes are given a random lucky
number instead of waiting time.
F. PROOF OF EXERCISE (POX)
PoX is an extension of PoW based on the idea that the
‘‘work’’ done by miner should be useful. Miners are given
a computation-expensive, real world matrix-based scientific
problem. An Employer E store the ‘‘exercise’’ X on available
store and deposits some credit on the blockchain, guarantee-
ing the availability of the exercise. MinerM collects all valid
transactions and is assigned a random X .M promises to solve
X and deposits a credit on the blockchain as a commitment
to solve X . Once M finds the solution Y for X , M creates a
verification transaction and publishes it for verifiers V . Once
predefined number of V validate the results, M collects all
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transaction details (exercise, deal, verification and audit) and
adds the block to the blockchain [45].
G. PROOF OF USEFUL WORK (POUW)
Similar to PoX, PoUW is an extension of PoW where miners
are required to solve a meaningful difficulty. It requires min-
ers to solve Orthogonal Vectors, 3SUM, All-Pairs Shortest
Path, and any problem that reduces to them. Delegators post
the problems to public problem board and the miners grab
those problems to mine the block and attach the proof of use-
ful work to the block. Verifiers check the block by checking
the hash of the newly proposed block and that the problem
P(f , x) has not been previously solved [46].
H. PROOF OF RESEARCH (PORES)
Proof of research (PoRes) is used in Gridcoin which con-
tributes 6.16 petaFlops [47] to Berkeley Open Infrastructure
for Network Computing (BOINC) [48]. PoRes combines PoS
and PoW where blockchain is secured using PoS and miner
are rewarded separately for performing computations to solve
scientific problems. The BIONC project server stores and
distributes project data to nodes running BIONC client. Upon
completion, the nodes return the results to the server which
rewards the node in BIONC credits. These BIONC credits
are converted to gridcoins to reward the participants. Similar
to mining pools [49], miners are rewarded for their relative
processing contribution to the project.
I. PROOF OF WORK TIME (POWT)
In Bitcoin’s PoW, difficulty level is regularly adjusted to
create blocks at regular interval. This leads to waste of com-
putational power required to find the nonce that satisfies the
target difficulty. PoWT proposes a variable block creation
rate that scales with the mining power. Block creation rate
increases with the mining power, increasing scalability and
transaction speed while simultaneously reducing the ‘‘waste’’
of computation power required to find the nonce. [50].1
J. MAGI’S PROOF OF WORK (MPOW)
The MPoW employs a network dependent reward which lim-
its the network’s hash rate. Reward is continuously adjusted
based on an attraction repulsion model. The network incre-
ments rewards to stimulate network activities during passive
mining phase and decrements rewarding to mitigate redun-
dant mining sources during aggressive mining phase [51].
Thismakes themining unsuitable formining pools and allows
low end devices to take part in mining. However, it opens the
network for an adversary to overcome the network hashing
power and launch a 51% attack1.
K. PROOF OF STAKE (POS)
Proposed for Peercoin [52], Proof of stake is the most popular
alternative of proof of work. It does not require the nodes to
consume excessive power to secure the network and achieve
151% attack is an event where an adversary controlling more than 50% of
network computational power can create his own version of the blockchain
history or prevent transactions for gaining confirmations.
consensus but rely on the nodes staking their coins to propose
the blocks and secure the network. The chances of selection
for creating next block depend on a mix of the tokens a node
hold and coin age (how long the tokens have been held). The
block proposer is required to stake its coin age to append to
the blockchain. The stake of the node is slashed if it acts
maliciously. Once the validator claims the reward, the coin
age is destroyed, allowing others to ‘‘win the raffle’’.
L. DELEGATED PROOF OF STAKE (DPOS)
DPoS is similar to PoS, but instead of stakeholders creat-
ing and validating the blocks, they nominate N number of
witnesses to do it on their behalf. Each witness is randomly
chosen to create next block and all witnesses get their turn.
The witnesses are reshuffled again once every witness has
had its turn. Delegates are also nominated by the stake-
holders, which moderate the blockchain and can control the
blockchain parameters such as rewards, block intervals, block
size, etc [53]. Stakeholders however, are given a cooling off
period to react to the changes made and either accept or
nullify the changes. Stakeholders can also remove delegates.
The transactions are performed much faster compared to
PoW or PoS because only selected witnesses participate in
the block validation.
M. FAIR PROOF OF STAKE (FPOS)
PoS allows the nodes with higher stakes to create more blocks
in comparison to the rest of network. FPoS is a proposed
‘‘improvement’’ on PoS, adding a ‘‘fair’’ probability of cre-
ating a block. Proposed solution is to use exponential dis-
tribution instead of uniform distribution in random variable
selection [54].
N. INTERACTIVE PROOF OF STAKE (IPOS)
IPoS requires communication among T participants for block
generation. The blockchain starts with T genesis blocks
instead of one in order to avoid breaking the ticket generation
rules. A unique seed value (known to all participants) from
the block headers determine the generators of next block.
A single node is allowed to sign and broadcast a block, but
each block required T weighted tickets from all T accounts.
Tickets are generated by using a special formula that uses the
seed value from current and previous block headers, public
keys and balance of the accounts. Every block is given a
score based on the ticket scores and the block and block and
blockchain with highest score wins.
IPoS proposes to minimize the number of variables a miner
can iterate over, as a protection mechanism for grinding
attacks. No delays or timestamps are explicitly stated and
the protocol operates as a weighted lottery where multiple
winners create a block [55].
O. PROOF OF STAKE BOO (POSBOO)
PoSBoo is a PoS scheme based on PoS Casper. A set of
pre-selected master nodes take part in consensus and block
creation [56]. Block reward is a multiplication of fixed block
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reward and network weight. 25% of the staked coins are
burned if a node tries to fork the chain by voting for two
blocks at the same height. Further penalties are imposed on
the nodes voting on false block more thanN number of times.
There is not much information available about PoSBoo at the
time of writing this paper.
P. LEASED PROOF OF STAKE (LPOS)
LPoS is an extension to the PoS consensus protocol. It allows
the users to ‘‘lease’’ their balances to other nodes. Nodes
with higher number of leased balances have higher chances of
selection to produce next block. This reduces the likelihood
of network being controlled by a single group of nodes,
by increasing the number of electablemembers [29]. Rewards
are shared between miners and lenders.
Q. PROOF OF STAKE TIME (POST)
PoST uses a non-linear proof function that accepts the dis-
tribution enhancing time and reject the time that diminishes
it, at a given block. This is achieved via a periodic time-
acceptance function that is proportional to the coins held
and relative to network strength. Idle-time is defined as the
fraction of age that no longer supports the distribution of con-
sensus and instead begins to degrade it. This quantified idle-
time is unique to each stake, as it decreases the probability to
meet the proof and impacts the fraction of earnable matured
interest via consensus.
Time active fraction f is mathematically defined as
f = cos2 (pip) {if (p > 0.45), f = m}
where the fraction of accepted age f is equal to the squared
cosine of the product of pi and that transaction’s consensus
power p. That is if p is greater than 0.45, otherwise all age
is lost, and time active fraction is set to minimum stake
time of 8 hours. p is measured as the fraction of coinage of
the network wide stake weight time. In order to maximize
the probability of earning all matured interest and signing a
block during a period of time, a node must stake actively to
ensure passage through the Stake-Time window for all coins
held [57].
R. PROOF OF STAKE VELOCITY (POSV)
PoSV encourages users to both stake and spend the tokens
by using an exponential decay function for coinage. In con-
trast to the traditional PoS protocols which consider coin
age as a linear product, new coins get coin age quickly in
PoSV and old coins age slowly. Probability of a node to be
selected as block leader depends on the wallet size and wallet
activity [58].
S. PROOF OF STAKE CASPER (POSC)
PoSC has been proposed as an alternative to PoW for
Ethereum. It was an early attempt at ‘‘nothing at stake’’ prob-
lem where validators are penalized for malicious activities.
PoSC relies on the checkpoint blocks whose height is exact
multiples of 100 in the checkpoint tree. Validators are divided
into dynasties, defined as the number of finalized checkpoints
from genesis block to the parent of the block. A validator V
can join the dynasty d + 2 when his deposit is included in
the block at dynasty d and can only leave at d + 2 dynasty if
withdrawing at a block at dynasty d [59].
T. MAGI’S PROOF OF STAKE (MPOS)
MPoS is also designed on the same attraction repulsion mod-
els, as MPoW. The stake weight is conditionally proportional
to the age and amount of the coin. Stake weight does not
always increase with the increase in the coin count and offline
staking is limited to a maximum of seven days [60].
U. TRANSACTION AS PROOF OF STAKE (TAPOS)
TaPoS requires all transactions to carry their proof of validity
with them, implicitly making all nodes generating transac-
tions to contribute to network security. Every transaction
contains the hash of most recent block informing the network
that the user’s stake is on a particular fork [61].
V. TRUSTLESS PROOF OF STAKE (TPOS)
TPoS allows users to safely stake their offline coins from
cold storage. Account owner can grant permission to a dif-
ferent address, merchant to stake on account holder’s behalf.
Merchant nodes does not take part in block creation or con-
vince nodes to accept transactions but can only validate
transactions. Stakeholders meeting the minimum collateral
requirements run masternodes. Masternodes verify transac-
tions, take part in voting and block generation [62].
W. OUROBORO
Ouroboros is a PoS variant which operates in epoch, com-
prising of fixed time slots. Slot leaders are elected from the
group of ‘‘qualifying’’ stake holders. Each epoch has exactly
one slot leader who is responsible for creating the block. The
slot leaders forN+1 epoch are elected during epochN , hence
the network already knows who will be the slot leaders for
next epoch. The chances of being elected as block leader are
proportional to the stake of a node [63].
X. PROOF OF AUTHORITY (POAUTH)
In PoAuth, preselected set of trusted ‘‘authorities’’ are given
the rights to propose blocks. The identity of the authorities
is verified both online and in public sector. Time is divided
into steps and each step S has a mining leader which can
create blocks. For each step, authorities take turn on round-
robin basis to propose the blocks and a block is accepted onto
the blockchain once it has been signed off by majority of the
authorized nodes [64]. PoA becomes intrinsically centralized
by identifying the authorities. Therefore, it is best suited for
private blockchains and consortiums.
Y. PROOF OF REPUTATION (POREP)
PoRep is an extension of PoAuth where the validator nodes
are selected based on their reputation. Reputation must be
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important enough that the participant should face serious con-
sequences financially and brand wise, if they act maliciously.
Once the validators are selected, the network then operates as
a PoAuth network. Block leader is selected by round-robin
lookup and a node can only sign a block every (N/2)+ 1
blocks, given N validators [65].
Z. PROOF OF PERSONHOOD (POPHOOD)
PoPHood makes use of ring signatures [66] and collec-
tive signing [67]. A set of volunteer organizers arrange a
pseudonym partywhere attending parties are known but indi-
viduals can remain anonymous. Each party is given exactly
one cryptographic identity, binding their physical and virtual
identity. The attendees who want to becomeminters are given
a week to authenticate themselves and form a minting pool.
RandHound [68] is used to generate randomness which is
used to select the next block proposer [69].
1) MULTICHAIN
Multichain, a private blockchain, restricts the mining to a set
of identifiable identities. A constraint is applied to the number
of blocks a miner can produce in a given window, stopping
the monopolization of mining process. This implements a
round-robin block creation schedule enforced by the mining
diversity parameter [70].
2) PROOF OF SIGNATURE (POSIGN)
Developed by XTRABYTESTM, PoSign relies on the autho-
rized STATIC nodes that communicate on a VPN like network
called VITALS. A PULSE signal is sent to each node when-
ever a transaction occurs on the network, alerting them to
validate and sign the new transaction. Communicating over
VITALS, online STATIC nodes validate and sign each block
and are rewarded in transaction fees [71]. Offline nodes will
double check the blocks when they come online but they do
not sign the blocks.
3) PROOF OF APPROVAL (POAPR)
In Proof of Approval, blocks are published periodically at
a pre-defined interval. Any node can propose a ‘‘candidate
block’’ and broadcast it to the network, however, a stake
holder is given weighted privilege. A quorum of stake holders
scores the candidate block by checking how close to the
target timeslot it was received by them. The nodes will reject
the proposed block if it did not include any potential valid
transactions or include any invalid ones. The nodes then
rank the qualified candidate blocks in descending score and
broadcast the list to the network. The creator of candidate
block with good score then packs the received approvals,
creates an approval block and broadcast it to the network.
Both the approval blocks and winning candidate block form
the blocks are finally added to the blockchain [72].
4) PROOF OF BELIEVABILITY (POBEL)
PoBel is a variation of PoS that relies on the ‘‘believability’’
score of a node, which is calculated at the beginning of
an epoch. Each user is given a score called ‘‘servi’’, for their
long term added value to the community. Believability is a
measure of servi and stake. servi is zerod upon block creation,
giving the next node with highest believability score a chance
to create the block. Validating nodes are divided into two
groups, believable league and a normal league. PoBel has
two phases. In the first phase, a believable validator quickly
processes the transactions and proposes a block by validating
and ordering a set of committed transactions. In second phase,
normal validators sample and verify the transactions. The user
loses all its stake and reputation if the normal validator detects
any misbehavior [73].
5) PROOF OF IMPORTANCE (POI)
PoI is a variation of PoS where each account is given an
importance score based on their stake in the network and the
overall network support [74]. Block proposer is selected by
choosing a user meeting the minimum stake requirements,
who has transferred some funds in last X days and have a rank
(NCDawareRank in Nem’s case) computed based on station-
ary probability distribution of Ergodic Markov chain [75].
6) PROOF OF DEVOTION (PODEV)
Proof of devotion is a hybrid of PoS and PoI where accounts
with highest influence in the ecology and liquidity are
selected. These accounts are given equal rights to create
blocks. The top ranked accounts voluntarily stake to become
block validators. Block proposer is chosen pseudo randomly
from the validators set. Validator sets are divided into dynas-
ties and validators cannot change dynasties within an epoch
of X blocks. All validators from the dynasty participate in
the round of BFT style, time bound voting to create the
block [76].
7) PROOF OF VALUE (POV)
PoV is a spinoff of PoRep, enabling peers to reach a con-
sensus about perceived value of contribution of an individual
to a network. Backfeed [77] and Sapien [78] are using PoV
to reward positive journalism whereas AI Crypto [79] is
using PoV to reward members for the derived value from the
projects.
8) PROOF OF ACTIVITY (POACT)
PoAct is a hybrid of PoW and PoS. Empty block header is
mined by the miners and the hash of the newly minded block
header is used to deterministically choose N pseudorandom
stake holders. Each stakeholder checks the validity of the
newly mined block template. Upon validation, the first N −1
stakeholders sign the hash of the empty block header and
broadcast their signature to the network. N th stakeholder
wraps the block by adding as many transactions as it wishes,
along with the previously acquired N − 1 signatures, signs
the block with its signature and broadcasts the wrapped block
to the network. All nodes check the validation of the block
and the block is added to the blockchain. Transaction fees are
shared between the miners and N stakeholders [80].
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9) LIMITED CONFIDENCE PROOF OF ACTIVITY (LCPOA)
LCPoA is an extension of Proof of Activity where the system
creates automatic checkpoints in the blockchain, limiting the
possibility of rewriting the history of the blockchain [81].
A 51% attack can still be carried out, but the attacker would
only be able to rewrite only a small number of blocks.
10) PROOF OF CAPACITY (POC)
PoC relies on the node’s storage capacity instead of the
computational power. Miners invest in disk space instead of
computing power and dedicating more disk space increases
the probability of successfully mining a block. Miners create
the chunks of data, known as plots, where pre-computed
hashes to forge the block are stored. The more plots a node
have, the better are the chances of append the next block to
the chain [82].
11) PROOF OF RETRIEVABILITY (POR)
PoR works similar to PoC. A prover P is required to store
some large dataset F and prove to a verifier V that the P
possesses F and F is fully retrievable. This verification takes
place as a challenge response protocol whereV issues random
challenges C and P provides responses R which V can verify
without possessing R. PoR allows the network to perform as
a decentralised distributed cloud storage [83].
12) PROOF OF SPACETIME (POSPACETIME)
PoSpaceTime is a variant of proof of storage which allows
a verifier to verify that a prover has stored its data for some
period. The prover generates short sequential proofs of stor-
age by using zk-SNARKS [84] and a verifier can easily verify
without interacting with the prover [85] Storage miners put
a collateral deposit and commit to store client’s data. Miners
then generate PoST and submit to the network, as a proof that
they are storing the data for agreed time [85].
13) PROOF OF REPLICATION (POREPL)
In PoRepl, a prover P is required to commit to store n
physically independent copies of some data D and store D
in a dedicated storage. Phas to convince a verifier V that P
is storing the unique physical copies instead of duplicating
multiple copies of D in the same storage space [86].
14) PRACTICAL BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE (PBFT)
PBFT implements a statemachine replication and can tolerate
(n−1)/3 faults [8]. Network comprises of leader and vali-
dating peer nodes. Block creation happens in rounds. Peers
receive the transactions, validate them and broadcast to the
network. At the end of each round, the leader orders the
transactions and put them in a block. Block creation process
is categorised as pre-prepares, prepare and commit phases.
The leader broadcasts the proposed block to the peers, in pre-
prepare phase. The peers store the block locally and broadcast
the same block to other peers in the prepare and commit
phase. Upon receiving 2/3 validations from the peers, nodes
will execute the commit phase and add the block to their
current blockchain.
15) TENDERMINT
Tendermint is a variant of PBFT, based on DLS protocol [87].
All transactions are first broadcasted to a group of validators,
which have some stake locked in the system. The validator
nodes vote on the valid transactions for their inclusion in
the blockchain. Voting takes place in three steps, prevote,
precommit and commit. A block is committed upon receiv-
ing 2/3 signatures from validator nodes. Block proposer is
chosen in a round-robin fashion, with a proportion to their
voting power, i.e. Stake. Tendermint is resilient up to 1/3 of
byzantine participants [88].
16) SUMERAGI
Heavily inspired by [89], Sumeragi applies the concept of
global order and divides the nodes into two sets, set 1 consist-
ing of 2f + 1 nodes and set two consisting of the remaining.
Considering only 2f + 1 signatures are required to confirm
a transaction, only nodes from set A take part in consensus.
Consensus is performed on every transaction in Sumeragi.
A lead validating peer verifies the transaction, orders, signs
and broadcasts transactions to the remaining validating peers.
Other validating peers validate the signature of transaction
along with the contents and temporarily update the ledger.
It then signs the Merkle root and hash of the transaction’s
content and broadcasts the finite ordered list of transactions.
Nodes keep sharing the valid parts of Merkle tree until roots
match [90].
17) THRESHOLD RELAY (T-RELAY)
DFINITY [91] uses a beacon as the source of leader selec-
tion and ranking based on the threshold relay technique.
A group of nodes called committee is selected to act as notary
and derive the random beacon which is used to select the
committee for next round. A fresh, verifiable random value
is produced by the randomness beacon at the beginning of
round r . Each node is given a priority rank by the randomness
beacon. Any node can pool the transactions and propose a
block, but the block proposed by highest priority rank has
more chances to be notarized. Upon receiving the blocks,
the notary waits for the blocktime, ranks the blocks, signs and
broadcast the block with highest rank. All nodes then append
their copies of the blockchain [91].
18) BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE –SMART (BFT-SMART)
BFT-SMaRt is the only known project that was developed
before the interest in permissioned blockchains surged around
2015 [70]. Bessani et al. [92] started work on it in 2009.
There is widespread agreement today that BFT-SMaRt is
the most advanced and most widely tested implementation
of a BFT consensus protocol available. BFT-SMART sup-
ports a configuration parameter that, if activated, makes the
system strictly crash fault-tolerant (CFT). When this feature
is active, the system tolerates f < n/2 (simple minority).
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Experiments have demonstrated that it can reach a through-
put of about 80,000 transactions per second in a LAN with
1000 nodes [92].
19) BFT RAFT– TANGAROA (BFT-RAFT)
Inspired from Raft [4] and PBFT [8], BFT-Raft aims to
maintain Raft’s safety, liveness and fault tolerance properties.
Nodes and users share the public keys with each other ahead
of time. Messages are always signed by both nodes and users
and messages carrying invalid signatures are rejected. A node
can be a leader, follower or a candidate. Leader is elected by
voting and it serves as a leader for a fixed time term. BFT-Raft
network of n nodes can tolerate f byzantine failures where
n ≥ 3f + 1 [93].
20) DELEGATED BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE (DBFT)
DBFT works similar to DPoS. Instead of witnesses and del-
egates, DBFT is composed of ordinary nodes and book-
keepers. The ordinary nodes vote for bookkeepers and the
successful bookkeepers take part in the consensus on behalf
of the ordinary nodes. A random bookkeeper is selected to
propose the next block and the block is added to the chain
only if more than 66% of the bookkeepers agree that the
transactions are valid.
The DBFT provides fault tolerance of n ≥ 3f + 1 [94].
Transaction throughput of nearly 1000 transactions per sec-
ond (TPS) has been recorded in NEO blockchain with block
interval of 15-20 seconds [94].
21) HYDRACHAIN (HC)
HydraChain is an extension of the Ethereum platform which
adds support for creating Permissioned blockchains. Inspired
by Tendermint, HC consensus protocol is a BFT protocol that
relies on a set of validators which form quorums and validate
the order of transactions. The block proposer is randomly
chosen from the set of validators. Consensus is achieved via
one or more rounds on the proposed block and new round can
only be started once more than 2/3 nodes have voted on the
previous round [95].
22) HONEYBADGER BFT (HB-BFT)
HB-BFT is the first practical asynchronous BFT protocol
which does notmake any timing assumptions [96]. HB-BFT’s
design is optimized for scenarios where network bandwidth
is scarce, but computation is fairly ample. Consensus is
achieved through N number of pre-selected nodes with
known identities. The goal of the nodes is to agree on the
ordering of the input, given some transactions. The nodes
maintain a transaction buffer and store the received trans-
actions in their buffers. The protocol proceeds in epochs.
At the start of each epoch, nodes choose a subset of the
transactions from their buffers and provide them as input to
an instance of a randomized agreement protocol. At the end
of the agreement process, the final set of transactions for the
epoch is chosen and this new set of transactions is added to the
committed log. A throughput exceeding 20,000 transactions
per second for networks of up to 40 nodes have been reported
by Miller et al. [96].
23) ISTANBUL BFT
Istanbul BFT is inspired by PBFT [8] and is used in
QuorumChain [97] which is an enterprise focused version
of Ethereum. Block proposer is selected randomly from the
validators in a round-robin fashion. Newly proposed block
is broadcasted to the network with the pre-prepare message.
Validators enter the pre-prepared stage and broadcast the
prepare message. The block proposer enters prepared state
upon receiving 2f + 1 prepare messages from the validators
and broadcasts commit message with a proposal to insert
the prepared block to the blockchain. Validators insert the
block to their chains upon receiving 2f +1 commit messages.
Istanbul BFT can tolerate 3f + 1 faulty nodes in a network of
N validators.
24) SCALABLE BFT (SBFT)
SBFT is a parallelization scheme enabling BFT systems to
scale with the number of available cores by binding all mes-
sages and tasks to a particular processor core. Actors exe-
cuting the replication protocol are organized in pillars where
each pillar is responsible for certain instances of consensus,
executed by a dedicated thread. Pillar numbers are kept in
direct alignment with the number of cores and requests are
managed at the same pillar level [98].
25) FEDERATED BYZANTINE AGREEMENT (FBA)
FBA can be considered as the most novel solution to the
byzantine general problem. Each participant maintains a list
of important nodes that it trusts. A transaction is consid-
ered settled when majority of the trusted nodes agree on
the settlement. The trusted nodes only consider a transaction
settled when the nodes they trust agree on the transaction.
Eventually, majority of the network agrees on the transaction,
making it immutable [99]. Nodes decide who they can trust.
Quorums and slices emerge because of the selectionsmade by
the nodes. Ripple and Stellar use their own versions of FBA,
both are discussed later.
26) RIPPLE CONSENSUS PROTOCOL (RCP)
Ripple relies on a trusted set of validating nodes to main-
tains its ledger. The ledger has two forms, last-closed ledger
and open ledger. Each validating node maintains its trusted
set of nodes called Unique Node List (UNL) where each
node must have an overlap with other nodes in the Ripple
network. Each node collects the latest transactions into a
‘‘candidate set’’ and broadcasts its candidate set to the UNL.
UNL nodes validate the transactions and broadcast their votes
to the network. Voting takes place in rounds. Transactions
that do not acquire validation votes are discarded from the
candidate setand the candidate setreceiving over 80% votes
from the UNL is considered valid and added to the ‘‘Last
closed Ledger’’ of Ripple network. Unverified transactions
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are kept in the open ledger until they meet 80% verification
target [100].
a: Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP)
SCP is a variant of FBA and uses the same notion of quorums
and quorum slices instead of trusting the whole network.
SCP relies on a set of validator nodes to achieve consensus.
Quorum is a set of nodes adequate to reach consensus and
a quorum slice is a subset of quorum which can help in
convincing a node about the agreement. Quorum intersec-
tions are required in order to achieve broader consensus and
finality [99].
b: Modified Federated Byzantine Agreement (MFBA
MFBA is a hybrid of FBA and PoS. Consensus takes
place among quorums and is spread through overlapping
nodes (FBA). Users stake their coins within a node and
earn rewards on the stake. This serves as economic incentive
to operate the node and also as a collateral if node acts
maliciously [101].
c: Proof of Burn (PoBurn)
In PoBurn, a node ‘‘burns’’ some tokens by sending them
to an irretrievable but verifiable address in order to gain
mining privilege on the system or generate coins on another
system [102]. The miners may be required to burn the native
token or some other cryptocurrency, like bitcoin. PoBurn
can be used as a migration ‘‘tool’’ or bootstrapping a new
coin [103].
d: Proof of Disintegration (PoD
PoD is an extension of PoBurn where the coins are not burnt
by sending them to an irretrievable & verifiable address, but
fully destroys the coins by disintegrating the coin, reducing
the circulating and total supply of the coin. PoD is performed
on special nodes called ‘‘fundamental nodes’’, which yield
more staking reward as compared to the normal nodes [104].
e: Proof of History (PoH)
PoH uses the collision resistance property of hashing func-
tions to create a high frequency variable delay function (VDF)
that can be used to prove that a transaction happened some-
time before or after the event. A leader node is randomly
chosen from the network to provide a PoH sequence, pro-
viding reliable global passage of time. The leader orders and
signs the transactions and broadcast them for verifier nodes
using the current state of the VDF. Verifiers execute the same
transactions on their copies of the state and publish their
signatures of state as confirmation. This serves as votes in
consensus. The hash is obtained on a single core by feeding a
random seed and incrementally hashing all hash outputs from
previous events and transactions on previous blocks [105].
f: Proof of Process (PoProcess)
PoProcess is based on the idea that every process can
be proved by combining the what (message digest),
who (digital signature), when (trusted timestamp) and where
(hashchain) stages of a process into a single proof called link
hash. Proof of one process can be included in into another
process as a step, forming nested proof of processes [106].
g: Proof of Time (PoTime)
PoTime is a decentralised, off-chain solution for Ethereum
to allow scheduled transactions. It is comprised of individual
nodes of the decentralized execution network behind the
Ethereum Alarm Clock [107] The timenode’s responsibility
is to execute a scheduled transaction and collect reward in
return. In order to avoid collision, a timenode can claim a
transaction by staking small amount of eth. The deposit is
lost if the timenode goes offline at the time of transaction
execution [108].
h: Raft - Quoru
Quorum [97] also uses Raft based consensus proto-
col. It works on a state replication model, all transactions are
replicated across all participating nodes while maintain the
sequence of the transactions, regardless of crashes [109].
i: Siev
Sieve was proposed by IBM Research and has been imple-
mented as a part of Hyperledger Fabric. Sieve treats the
blockchain as a black box and executes the processes related
to non-deterministic operations such as smart contracts and
then compare the results. Small number of processes are
filtered out if they are detected to create divergence. The
whole operation is ‘‘sieved out’’ of the sequence if divergence
is found among too many processes [110].
j: Tangle
Tangle is a DAG consensus protocol used by IOTA [111].
Each transaction forms a vertex, known as site. Every new
transaction has to approve two previous transactions. This
approval represents the edge of the graph. Theoretically, a tan-
gle can scale to infinite number of transactions per second.
To prevent malicious nodes from spamming the network,
each new transaction has to perform a lightweight PoW at the
approval stage. Tangle is effective against quantum computer
attacks as well [111].
k: Hashgrap
Hashgraph is a proprietary consensus protocol developed by
SwirldsTM [112]. Each node maintains its own DAG (Hash-
graph) and information is shared in a gossip manner, simi-
lar to the blockchains. Vertices or transaction data is called
events and each event carries a creation timestamp which
is used in the final ordering. Events are hashed along with
their history, so each event confirms the entire gossip history.
Nodes constantly share the events unknown to their peers,
in topological order. The receiving node adds the previously
unknown valid events to their graph and at the end of the sync,
the receiving node creates and signs a new event that includes
any transactions the receiving node intends to submit.
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Every event is given two properties, an id that puts the node’s
events in incremental order and a binary value ‘‘witness’’, set
to true if an event is first created by a particular node in the
round. An event is declared ‘‘famous’’ if it is a witness and
was received by several nodes quickly after the creation. The
protocol guarantees that all events will be eventually declared
‘‘famous’’ or ‘‘non-famous’’ if 2/3 of nodes continue to gossip
forever [113]. The network is randomly divided into shards
and shards trust each other. Consensus occurs within the shard
but shards honour requests from other shards as long as the
requesting shard can prove it. Each node votes on the arrival
time of a transaction and the median time of all timestamps
is used for ordering the transaction.
l: Block-lattic
In Block-lattice, every account gets their own blockchain
(account-chain) that only they can write to, and everyone
holds a copy of all of the chains [114]. The account owner
can update its own account-chain asynchronous to the block-
lattice. Every transaction is broken down into a send block on
the sender’s chain and a receive block on the receiving party’s
chain. There are no overheads in non-conflict transactions
and conflicts are resolved via balance-weighted voting. The
weight of a node’s votewi is the sum of the balances of all
accounts that have named it as its representative. The node
keeps a cumulative tally for 4 voting periods totaling up to
1 minute for all incoming votes from M representatives and
confirms the winning block. The most popular block b∗ will
have the majority of the votes and will be retained in the
node’s ledger.
b∗ = argbj max v(bj)
Nano has recorded 10,000 transactions per second on a
reference implementation of block-lattice [114].
m: SPECTR
SPECTRE (Serialization of Proof-of-work Events) is a pro-
posed improvement on bitcoin’s blockchain. It generalizes
the blockchain into a DAG (BlockDAG), achieving high scal-
ability. It allows miners to mine block concurrently and with
high frequency. SPECTRE requires the miners to embed a
list of hashes of all the leaf blocks in the header of newly
mined block [115]. It does not produce a linear ordering of
the blocks but every block agrees on the pairwise ordering
of any two previous blocks. SPECTRE is more suitable for
payment networks where totality is more important than the
ordering. It is not suitable for execution of smart contracts
where ordering is important for computational reasons.
n: PHANTO
PHANTOM is a successor of SPECTRE which produces
similar BlockDAG structure but provides a total ordering
of the blocks and transactions. This total ordering property
makes PHANTOM suitable for smart contracts but it is not
as scalable as SPECTRE [33].
IV. USE OF DLTS AND SUITABILITY OF CONSENSUS
PROTOCOLS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
Public sector has shown significant interest in DLTs. Several
pilots, case studies and real world applications have been
developed utilizing variant forms of DLTs. Estonian gov-
ernment is by far a leader in adopting blockchain in public
services. Estonia chose a private permissioned blockchain
model for e-services, such as prescriptions, court system,
banking, business and land register [119]. According to the
Director of Future Borders of UK, HMRC (Her Majesty
Revenue and Customs) has ‘‘built a proof of concept based
on blockchain that demonstrates that you can actually get all
of the 28 organizations that act at the border to coordinate all
of their risk and intervention’’ [120].
Similarly, HM Land Registry also recently commissioned
a private blockchain (R3 Corda) based pilot project to speed
up the conveyancing process and at the same time make it
fraudulent proof. Canadian government is using a private-
permissioned approach to publish grants information on
Ethereum blockchain for public disclosure [121]. ‘‘Layer 2’’
and ‘‘side-chain’’ solutions are also a potential candidate for
public sector. Brazil plans to use Ethereum to collect petition
data from its citizens. The citizens signs a petition through a
mobile app and the root hash of all signatures is published to
the blockchain [122].
A pattern in all of the above public sector centric exam-
ples is that only a set of privileged nodes (writers) have the
write access and all projects are using a private permissioned
network.
Birch et al. [123] argue that private DLTs should be pre-
ferred when a set of privileged group members are respon-
sible for maintaining the integrity of the ledger. Wüstl &
Gervais also conclude that permissioned DLTs should be
considered when all writers are known [124]. WalPort [116]
argues that permissioned DLTs are more suitable for Gov-
ernments because they allow the owners to enforce rules
and limit the usage of the system. The ability of granular
control in permissioned DLTs make them more suitable for
public sector [117]. This also support the argument in their
framework for DLT evaluation. A recent report on DLTs by
Campbell et al. [118] for Scottish governments also pins
down that permissioned DLTs are better suitable for public
services as only authorized government actors should access
the DLT and have the authority to make changes to it.
Therefore, we believe that the consensus protocols that are
designed for public DLTs are automatically less favorable for
usage in public services sector (for the reasons highlighted
by [116], [117], and [118]). We believe that authority-based
consensus protocols with known participants are more suit-
able for public sector.
We analyzed all protocols discussed in section III regard-
ing their suitability for public and private instances of
DLTs, write permissions, overall efficiency of the network,
the requirement of built in incentive to compensate the par-
ticipants, control of an organization on the network events
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TABLE 2. Comparison of the reviewed consensus protocols and their
suitability for public sector based on the government’s preferences. we
believe that governments like to work with known and trusted identities
and need control.
TABLE 2. (Continued.) Comparison of the reviewed consensus protocols
and their suitability for public sector based on the government’s
preferences. we believe that governments like to work with known and
trusted identities and need control.
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TABLE 2. (Continued.) Comparison of the reviewed consensus protocols
and their suitability for public sector based on the government’s
preferences. we believe that governments like to work with known and
trusted identities and need control.
and knowledge about the participants taking part in the con-
sensus/maintaining the ledger. Public sector can also benefit
from the computational power of public DLTs by frequently
committing the ‘‘backups’’ to public DLTs. In Table 2,
we have highlighted 21 (out of 66 reviewed) consensus proto-
cols suitable for public sector based on the above discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
We have outlined and mapped 66 consensus protocols for
private and public DLTs. We believe that no single con-
sensus protocol is a perfect fit for all business needs. One
must seriously consider their business needs and deployment
environment before choosing the DLT model and consensus
protocol involved. The consensus in hostile and untrusted
public environment has to be complex and must include
incentives and severe penalties for the participant nodes to
ensure integrity of the network and to prevent the network
from fraudulent nodes. Therefore, security in public DLTs is
achieved at the cost of speed and scalability. Conversely, in a
private setting with trusted participating nodes, the consensus
protocols can be simple and also do not require a reward
mechanism as the participating bodies have business interests
to protect and secure the network, therefore can focusmore on
speed and scalability. We have highlighted some consensus
protocols suitable for public sector based on the argument
that public sector prefers control and authorities on consen-
sus building process, therefore private DLTs are preferable
over public DLTs. Paradoxically this contradicts the funda-
mental decentralization ethos of DLT and vision of Open
Government/Data.
As the distinction between digital and physical world
is diminishing in an unprecedented rate, data, particularly
personal behavioral data is becoming a high valued com-
modity both for governments and corporations. Therefore,
there is a growing call for rights of the citizen to privacy and
ownership of personal data. Along with regulations like EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), cryptographic
capability of DLT can not only enable ‘‘disclosure without
exposure’’ [118] but also can pave the path to ‘‘self-sovereign
identity’’[125].
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